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Wannsee Villa and Jews

C. Pogonowski|Thursday, July 16, 2009

The luxurious mansion known as the Wannsee Villa was the site of a meeting whose goal was to coordinate the German ministries engaged in the implementation of the “Final Solution of the Jewish Question.” The event known as the “Wannsee Conference” took place on January 20, 1942, and the meeting (attended by Nazi civilian government and SS officials) proclaimed and mapped out “The Final Solutionof the Jewish Question.”  All this was done in secrecy, of course. Wannsee was a major departure from the previous Nazi plan to deal with the Jews known as the Madagascara Plan.

The Wannsee Villa had an interesting history that has some irony to it. It was built by one of the richest men in the early twentieth-century Berlin, Dr. Alexander Helphand, also known as “Parvus,” a leftist Jewish tycoon who made money as an arms dealer during WWI and handled German subsidies for the Bolshevik Revolution. Parvus’s mistress  was Rozalia Luksenburg, better known as Rosa Luxenburg, a famous  Polish-born Jewish communist  who together with her lover was staunchly opposed to the independence of Poland. Helphand was the author of Berlin’s strategy for elimination of the Eastern Front by  means of German support of the revolution in  czarist Russia. It is estimated that the German Treasury spent an equivalent of ten tons of gold, to finance the demoralization and collapse of the admittedly barbaric Russian empire. Aleksander Helphand’s career is described in Z. A. B. Zeman’s and W. B. Scharlau’s The Merchant of Revolution – The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus), London, Oxford University Press, 1965.  
The logic of the new German strategy articulated at the Wansee meeting becomes understandable when one considers the dire situation of Germany fighting the war on two fronts (after the United States joined the war). In 1941, when Germany attacked Soviet Russia, the Jewish dominated international bankers mobilized help for the Soviets. Help began to pour in from America to Russia: Averell Harriman was in charge of helping the Soviets to fight the Germans.
Before the Wannsee decisions were taken, Hitler’s government considered forcibly relocating the entire Jewish population of Europe to the French island colony of Madagascar.  In May 1940 H. Himmler stated the following in his “Reflections on the treatment of People of Alien Races in the East:” “I hope that the concept of Jews will be completely extinguished through the possibility of a large migration of all Jews to Africa.”  At that time, Hitler’s victory in France seemed certain and therefore French colonies were considered to be virtually under German control. Hitler hoped to conclude a favorable peace treaty with England, which was to experience German aerial bombardment and was expected to capitulate as quickly as did the French. The Nazis expected that the French would turn over the Madagascar colony to Germany in the peace treaty. They hoped that the French and the British navies would be at their disposal for use in the evacuation of Jews from Europe. Evacuation plan was set in motion by the Jewish Department of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on June 3, 1940. However, the  Jewish intelligentsia was to be held by the Nazis as hostages against the expected intervention of American Jews. On August 15th, 1940, Adolf Eichman released the text “Reichssicherheitshauptamt: Madagascar Projekt” according to which one million Jews per year were to be shipped to Madagascar over the period of four years.  Similarly, Hans Frank, the ruler of the General Government of occupied Poland, supported the project of resettlement of four million Jews to Madagascar, rather than the deportation of European Jews to Poland. Deportation of Jews was stopped on July 10, 1940.  The construction of the Warsaw ghetto was also stopped at that time (see <Wikipedia.org /Madagascar Plan>). The Wafen SS was to control and oversee Jewish government on the island and convert it into a “super ghetto” organized as a police state. By June 18, Hitler and Ribbentrop discussed the Madagascar Plan with Mussolini. Goering’s office was to oversee the administration of Jewish economics within the Madagascar Plan, also called “The Four Year Plan.”  
Nazi failure in the Battle of Britain, in which Polish pilots played a significant role, spelled out the collapse of Hitler’s notion about the use of the British fleet for the evacuation ofthe Jews from Europe. By early December (one year before the “Wannsee Conference” took place), the Madagascar Plan was abandoned by the Nazis.  Many Holocaust profiteers and other members of the Holocaust Industry do not like to mention the Madagascar Plan or even to admit the significance of the Wannsee Meeting, because they are trying to create an impression that the genocide of the Jewish population was born much earlier in Germany and elsewhere in Christian Europe.   
The Wannsee meeting took place soon after the defeat of Hitler’s army in the battle for Moscow. While the Madagascar deportation plan was conceived during expectation of Nazi victory on the western front, the plan for the “Final Solution” was conceived in the realization, that Nazi defeat was possible, and that with the defeat, millions of the feared “Ost Juden” or eastern Jews, could migrate into Germany. The possibility of this Jewish migration was what the Nazis wanted to preempt because of their racism, fear of communist victory, and fear of Jewish domination which Germans had already experienced during the Weimar Republic.  
Thus, by the end of January 1942 Jews became the number one target of Nazi killings. Up till then the Poles were numer one victims.  
This the symbolism of Wannsee for the Nazis is obviously very different than it is for Israel. In German history the Nazis left a memory of criminal behavior and defeat.  Many Germans realize that it was there that the decision to exterminate the Jews was taken. However, under the influence of the Holocaust industry, the Germans recently seem to try to blur the line between Wannsee and other events of World War II. They would like to pretend that such a momentous decision had never been made, that the murder of Jews just happened and was not  something that was carefully planned and executed with tacit acceptance of German society. The Wannsee is an inconvenience for Germans, and it is a great inconvenience for the Holocaust industry. So in present-day scholarship the importance of the Wannsee meeting tends  to be minimized. It may be expected that, if untruths about World War II continue to be manufactured, the very word “Wannsee” will disappear from Western memory altogether. Poland's Pre-WWII Activities Helped to Sow the Seeds of Defeat of Germany in the Global War For some time now the current "zeitgeist" has portrayed Poland in a rather limited role as a hapless and quickly-defeated first victim of Germany's WWII war machine. The commonly held view is not justified. The Polish Army destroyed in combat one third of German tanks and one fourth of the airplanes used against it. German records indicate that in order to defeat in 1940 the French and British armies, the Germans used less than half as much ammunition, artillery shells, and bombs than was used against the Poles in September 1939. Polish forces stayed engaged against Germany after the bloody battles of September 1939. However, the crucial role of Poland was the derailment of Hitler's strategy already in January 1939.
The derailment of Hitler's strategy by Poland, relates to Poland's pre-war actions in steadfastly refusing repeated overtures to become wartime partners with Germany against the USSR. Poland frustrated Hitler's efforts to build up the anti-Comintern Pact. This is clear in the diplomatic evidence of several years of Hitler's initiatives in order to gain the participation of Poland in a crusade against the USSR. Hitler hoped to have some 600 divisions against the Soviet Union. They were to be led by Germany and Japan. This huge prospective force was to have included some 220 German divisions, 200 Japanese, 100 Polish and 80 of other pact members. Prospective Polish forces were estimated at about 3.5 million men or ten percent of the population.
Ambassador Jozef Lipski documented in his book "Diplomat in Berlin 1933-39" Hitler's declarations since Aug. 5, 1935, that good Polish-German relations were of primary importance to him. He proposed an alliance against Russia, military cooperation, an air pact, etc. However, the government of Poland knew that the essence of the policies of the Nazi government, at all times, was the implementation of the doctrine of Lebensraum which meant eventual annexation by Germany of Poland and other Slavonic countries between the Baltic and the Black Sea.
Poland announced its refusal to join the anti-Comnitern Pact at the worse possible time for Germany. In Warsaw, on January 26, 1939, the government of Poland told Joahim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister, that Poland will not join. This happened after the Japanese took two Soviet islands on the River Amur in 1937 and attacked the Red Russian Independent Eastern Army on the border of Manchuko in 1938 and then, at the beginning of 1939, started moving against Outer Mongolia.
The refusal by the Poles to join the pact, shattered Hitler's strategic plans and led the Berlin government to gamble with a rapprochement with Moscow, which antagonized Japan. German predicament was evident when Poland, France and Great Britain exchanged common defense guarantees in March 1939 and Germany faced an eventual two front war if it attacked Poland. It is said that Admiral Canaris upon learning about Poland's rejection of the anti-Comintern Pact told Reinhard Heydrich that Germany did not have enough soldiers to win the coming war. The resulting complications in German-Japanese relations were soon apparent.
Hitler said to Jacob Burkhardt, Commissioner of the League of Nations on August 11, 1939, that: "Everything I undertake is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, I shall be compelled to come to an agreement with the Russians, beat the West and then, after their defeat, turn against the Soviet Union with all my forces. I need the Ukraine so that they can not starve me out as happened in the last war." (Roy Dennan "Missed Chances," Indigo, London 1997, p. 65). Hitler called the coming conflict "the war of the engines" ("Motorenkrieg"). Ironically the German army used 600,000 horses in addition to the 200,000 trucks, which were less dependable than the horses according to Stephen Badsey, "World War II Battle Plans" 2000, p. 96.
Stalin fearful of a two front war by Germany and Japan against the USSR decided to stop the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuko by a Soviet offensive in August 1939. According to The Oxford Companion to World War II (Oxford University Press, 1995) Soviet general Grigory Zhukov was the first in history to use the blitz-krieg tactics. These tactic were developed jointly by the Germans and the Soviets on Soviet polygons after the Treaty of Rapallo of April 16, 1922. From May 28, 1939 the largest air battles in history up to that time were fought in Asia and involved 140 to 200 Soviet and Japanese aircraft (A. Stella, Khalkhin-Gol, "The Forgotten War", Journal of Contemporary History, 18, 1983).
Stalin, concerned that the Japanese aimed to cut the Trans-Siberian railway, send Zhukov to organize a counteroffensive using 35 infantry battalions, 20 cavalry squadrons, 500 aircraft and 500 of the new and powerful T34 tanks. This force outnumbered the forces of the advancing Kwantung Army. On August 20, Zhukov launched a surprise offensive and in ten days inflicted massive casualities on the Japanese. "Zhukov's essential achievement lay in combining tanks, artillery, aircraft and men in an integrated offensive for the first time in modern war. By 31 August, the Russians have completed what they described as the most impeccable encirclement of the enemy army since Hannibal beat the Romans at Cannae. The 23rd Division of the Kwantung Army was virtually wiped out, and at least 18,000 Japanese were killed."(P. Snow "Nomonhan -the Unknown Victory", History Today, July 1990).
"Hitler's Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939, seen by the Japanese government as a betrayal of the anti-Comintern Pact, reinforced Japan's decision to use Hitler, but never to trust him. The Nazi-Soviet pact was announced during a Japanese military disaster. ... Hostilities ended officially on September 16, 1939..." (Laurie Barber, "Checkmate at the Russian Border: Russian-Japanese Conflict before Pearl Harbour", 2000). The next day, on September 17, 1939 the Soviets, free of the armed conflict with Japan, invaded Poland. The Soviets were aware that the French were not about to keep their promise to attack Germany, when 70 percent of German forces were engaged in Poland, despite the fact that France had more tanks than Germany.
Joahim von Ribbentrop tried on March 28, 1941, in Berlin to convince count Oshima, the Ambasador of Japan, to deliver a "crushing blow" against the USSR together with Germany. The Germans wanted the Jpanese to cut the trans-Siberian railway in central Asia and to attack Vladivostok. When the Germans were advancing deep into Russia, Richard Sorge, the Soviet spy in Tokyo, had on November 1, 1941, informed Stalin that Japan will not resume attacks against USSR in Asia. However, the Japanese sunk several Soviet ships and increased their forces in Korea an Manchuria as if they were planning to attack the Soviets. Next month, Hitler declared war on the United States four days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Apparently Hitler made his decision hopping in vain for a Japanese attacks on the USSR while he was getting reports about American Navy's armed intervention against German submarines in the Atlantic. After the naval battle on Sept 4, 1941 between the USS Grear and a German submarine, President Roosevelt publicly ordered US Navy to shoot on sight any German submarine. ("Oxford History of the American People", Oxford University Press, 1965)
The situation of the German Army on the eastern front suddenly worsened. "On 1 December, [1941] Army Group Centre made a last all-out attack to take Moscow, but the balance of forces favoured the defender. ... At down of 3 December, Zhukov's Siberian divisions [100,000 men with 300 tanks and 2000 artillery pieces] crushed through the extended flanks of the [German] Army Group Centre." (Stephen Badsey, "World War II Battle Plans" 2000, p. 98).
Had Poland been pragmatic rather than principled and made possible for Hitler to have the 600 divisions to defeat the USSR and take the oil fields of the Middle East, world history would have been different. Nazi Germany rather than the Soviet Union would have been the counterbalance to US power in the world after the WWII during most of the second alf of the twentieth century.
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