Gold and Iron

jan Peczkis|Friday, November 26, 2010

Instead of repeating other reviewers, I focus mostly on unmentioned content. This book focuses on the German Jew Gerson Bleichroeder, Bismarck's chief banker, and gives much insight into the situation facing Germany's Jews. Owing to the fact that I am a student of Polish history, I slant my review in that direction.

   
   
       
   
   
       
Note that Poland had been partitioned to Prussia, Russia, and Austria in the late 1700's. During the Russian-ruled Poles' unsuccessful January Insurrection (1863), Bismarck not only was willing to intervene on Russia's behalf, but he strongly opposed any reforms, by any ruling nation, that would give the subjugated Poles any freedom. Stern notes that: "Bismarck, like Marx, like most Germans, felt a peculiar fury against the Poles." (p. 29). As for Bleichroeder, "He shared Bismarck's harshness, and, like so many other Germans, the triumph of German arms instilled in him an uncritical admiration for power and a terrible respect for all things military." (p. 147).

The German-Jewish symbiosis, which led to a strong Prussia, all but ruled out a resurrected Polish state in the 1800's. This symbiosis is thus described by Stern: "The growth of Prussian power presented the Jews with great opportunities. By the alacrity with which they exploited these opportunities, they in turn accelerated Prussia's growth." (p. 19). "Lines between Germans and Jews were crossed: in friendship and in marriage." (p. 466). Also: "Bleichroeder...proved how profitable German-Jewish coexistence could be for both parties." (p. 464). Bleichroeder's experience can be generalized to German Jews in general: "Perhaps never before in Europe has a minority risen as fast or gone as far as did German Jews in the nineteenth century." (p. 498). For Poles, all this could only cement the image of Jews and Germans jointly profiting from the exploitation of Poles, and sharing a joint interest in preventing Poland from ever regaining her independence.

Stern provides facts and figures on how the German Jews prospered as a whole. (p. 499). This extended to Jews living in territories adjacent to, and overlapping with, Prussian-ruled Poland: "In many cities in Silesia, Jews constituted about 4 percent of the population and paid more than 20 percent of the taxes--an index of their disproportionate income." (p. 499).

Along with some other influential Jews, Bleichroeder was involved in railroad-building projects, some of which crossed occupied Poland, connecting the Russian and Prussian empires. (p. 253). The railroads benefited Poland's rulers, and were seen by Poles in that light.

This book once explicitly mentions how German Jews became both unwitting and witting tools of Bismarck's oppression of Prussian-ruled Poland. Stern writes: "A few months later Bleichroeder begged the king for support of a similar scheme in the Prussian province of Posen [Poznan], which contained most of Prussia's Polish subjects. The plan called for the establishment of an agricultural bank which by issuing shares would raise capital with which to buy land in order to sell it to peasants and tenants and to build roads and canals on behalf of local communities. In his petition Bleichroeder stressed that this project `aims at the strengthening of the Prussian-national element in the Grand Duchy of Posen.' Bleichroeder's petition has been cited as proof of his desire to promote the GERMANISIERUNG of Posen; it is also possible that he stressed that element in order to gain the king's support for a profitable venture." (p. 53). Regardless of Bleichroeder's exact motives, this influential Jew's active promotion of the aggressive Germanization of Polish lands could only antagonize Poles against both Jews and Germans.

On another subject, many German Jews came to believe that, as Jews advanced in German society and proved their usefulness to her, German anti-Semitism would die out. (e. g., p. 467). Instead, the Jewish successes led to a backlash. Jews were feared as "taking over" Germany. Racist theories that developed in the late 19th century contributed to the problem, although not all racists were anti-Semites and not all anti-Semites were racists. (p. 509). Already in the 1870's, Paul de Lagarde called for the extermination of the Jews. (p. 496). However, author Stern, a German Jew himself, concludes that, despite the popularity of anti-Semitism in many nations, "...anti-Semitism as a concerted effort to translate anti-Jewish sentiment into political action achieved importance principally in Germany and Austria." (p. 497). German nationalism grew more intolerant of minorities, and of pluralism in general, than did nationalistic movements in other nations. (p. 462).

An incident, which included a harsh German expulsion of both Polish gentiles and Polish Jews from the German prefect of Metz, prompted Stern to note the following: "There is an almost uncanny quality to the incident: At the birth of the new Empire, the first victims of chauvinistic brutality were Poles and Jews; they were also the last victims of a united Germany." (p. 147). [Stern published this in 1979, before the post-WWII partition of Germany into two nations had been reversed.]