"It's difficult to admit the obvious"
political world

Post-Communist Restitution and the Rule of Law

jan peczkis|Saturday, June 3, 2017

This book wades into a lot of legalese detail, and it is not always easy to figure out what the author is driving at. However, there are a number of salient themes, which I discuss:

HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY: ARE JEWS SUPPOSED TO BE ENTITLED TO SPECIAL RIGHTS?

Although he does not put it in these words, author Csongor Kuti seems to be ambivalent on this question. He writes,


 

“In the context of the Holocaust, expropriation of Jewish property appears as part of the genocidal project, while communist nationalization targeted the eradication of the entire system of private property, and by that the (at least political and economical) annihilation of ‘exploitative classes’.” (p. 4).

“Of course, Holocaust reparations took place in an entirely different context: confiscation of Jewish assets was part of a genocidal program, which makes these claims more compelling.” (p. 119). [???]

“The principles of violation of fundamental rights and of political discrimination may constitute perfectly defendable justifications for property reparations in the context of indigenous or Holocaust restitution (takings as part of a genocidal project), but are rather weak arguments in the context of Communist-era expropriations.” (pp. 288-289). [Are they?]

THE HOLOCAUST INDUSTRY IN THE LIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT STRASBOURG

Author Csonger Kuti lists 22 pages on which the intervention of the Strasbourg court, in property-restitution cases, is discussed. (p. 325). This includes in Poland (e. g, p. 248). However, Kuti does not examine the implications the Strasbourg court’s meddling in the affairs of sovereign European nations. For instance, given the prominence of Holocaust Supremacism in the ideology of the European Union, and the considerable influence of Jews in international politics, could the Holocaust Industry use the Strasbourg court as a tool to force its will on Poland?

POLAND AND OVERALL PROPERTY RESTITUTION: WHY POLES PAY FOR NON-POLISH CRIMES?

The author comments, “Poland has not yet enacted a comprehensive norm of the regulation of nationalized properties…” (p. 85).

Author Kuti focuses on efforts of the Polish government to compensate, in some way, those Poles who were deprived of their property in the former Kresy. (pp. 268-269). However, Kuti fails to point out that this makes the Polish taxpayer liable for the consequences of the acts of Germans, Russians, British, and Americans. After all, it was the joint Soviet/German 1939 conquest of Poland that made the Kresy fall under Soviet rule, and it was the policies of the USSR that unilaterally expropriated Polish properties. In addition, the disgraceful Churchill-Roosevelt sellout of Poland, at Teheran (1943) and Yalta (1945), legitimized and made permanent this Soviet theft of Poland’s eastern half, and all the properties on it. So why should Poles pay for any of it? [My parent’s property was among those confiscated by the USSR. As the heir, I would not want a penny of restitution unless the monies came from the Russians, British, and/or Americans.]

The same consideration applies to properties expropriated by Poland’s postwar Soviet-imposed and Western-acquiesced puppet government. Poles had no say in this, so why should today’s Poles pay for the consequences of its crimes?

The reader needs to go deeper. Kuti does not examine this dangerous precedent of Poles paying, to Poles, for crimes not committed by Poles, and for crimes committed by Poles that had not been elected by the Polish people. Could the Holocaust Industry exploit this to force the Polish taxpayer to pay, to self-appointed Jewish organizations, for German crimes and for the consequences of German crimes, and for the consequences of Poland's Communist puppet state?

POLAND’S 1997 LAW ON THE RESTITUTION OF JEWISH COMMUNAL PROPERTIES

Author Kuti editorializes, “Another common feature of the Central and East European restitution programs is the relative delay with which Jewish properties were included in the schemes, especially in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In Poland, for instance, the law on the restitution of Jewish property was enacted several years after the restitution of the other (notably the Catholic Church’s) property, only in 1997. The law allows only for local community’s claims; however, these are extremely reduced in numbers, as almost the entire Polish Jewry has fallen prey to the Holocaust.” (p. 192).

Elsewhere, Kuti (pp. 198-199) complains about what he calls the “privileged status of churches”, especially in Poland and Hungary, in terms of the actual restitution of former assets. Kuti does not seem to appreciate the fact that the Catholic Church is one of the pillars of a free Poland. In addition, Kuti seems oblivious to the fact that Communism was, first and foremost, an antireligious movement that had specifically targeted the Church and its properties. (On the other hand, the Communists indiscriminately nationalized the Nazi-German-confiscated properties of Poles and Jews alike, without distinction.)
Copyright © 2009 www.internationalresearchcenter.org
Strony Internetowe webweave.pl